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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BUDGET SYSTE.M, INC.,
Plaintiff and Res·pondent,
vs.

Case No. 9224

BUDGET LOAN AND
FINANCE P·LAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
The respondent on page 4 of its brief refers
to a letter written by J. S. Monosson, at that time
house counsel of Budget Finance Plan (the holding company of appellant) and addressed to the
American Buyers Credit Company, who had purchased the stock of Budget System, Inc. This letter
was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P-11 (Transcript of Proceedings, page 46) and considered by
the trial court over the objections of appellant
(Tra11script of Proceedings, page 45) that such
evidence was incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant.
The appellant in this reply brief wishes to show
1
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that such a letter should not have been admitted
in evidenee and considered by the trial court in
making its decision; that such evidence is inadmissible and cannot be considered in this cause.
STATE'MENT OF P'OINTS
POINT I.
OUT OF COURT ADMISSIONS BY AN ATTORNEY
NOT DISPENSING WITH THE PROOF OR INFLUENCING THE PROCEDURE IN THE CASE ARE INADMISSIBLE UNLESS THE ATTORNEY HAD SOME
SPECIAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH STATEMENTS.
POINT II.
AN ATTORNEY HAS NO IMPLIED CONSENT TO
SURRENDER ANY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF HIS
CLIENT, OR IMP AIR OR DESTROY HIS CLIENT'S
CAUSE OF ACTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
OUT OF COURT ADMISSIONS BY AN ATTORNEY
NOT DISPENSING WITH THE PROOF OR INFLUENCING THE PROCEDURE IN THE CASE ARE INADMISSIBLE UNLESS THE ATTORNEY HAD SOl\iE
SPECIAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH STATEMENTS.

Respondent on page 4 of its brief refers to
Exhibit P-11 and quotes the words of Mr. Monosson, house counsel for Budget Finance Plan, in
his letter to the American Buyers Credit Company
to the effect that appellant's organization had been
unable to utilize the name used by its other offices
by reason of the fact that the name "Budget Plan"
2
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was pre-empted by Mr. Barker, the predecessor in
Salt Lake City of the American Buyers Company.
Respondent on page 11 of its brief states further
that the above statement of Mr. Monosson coincides with the decision reached by the trial court
and therefore should conclude the matter. In other
words, respondent and the trial court are holding
the appellant for the statement of its house counsel which was an out of court admission by an
attorney and not made for the specific judicial purpose of dispensing with the proof or for influencing
the procedure in the actual case.
It will be noted that the American Buyers
Company, to whom· the letter (Exhibit P-11) was
addressed, is not the plaintiff in this action and
was nothing more nor less than the purchaser of
the common stock of the plaintiff. Mr. Monosson
apparently was not acquainted with all of the facts
in this case as in his letter he refers to the predecessors of American Buyers Company. The plaintiff and respondent is the successor to Mr. Barker
and not the American Buyers Company. In this
case there is no question that a letter to a stockholder should not be admissible. Although he was
secretary of the company, his letter was in capacity
as counsel.
The courts have uniformly held that an attorney
employed without reference to pending litigation
3
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is but an agent, and his a:uthority to bind his principal by his ad1nissions is not affected by the fact
that he is an attorney at law, except insofar as that
fact may reflect upon the apparent scope of the
agency. Brown v. Hebb (Md. 1934) 175 A. 602.
Carroll v. Pratt (Minn. 1956) 76 NW2d 69'3
is a key case in this area of the law holding that
the attorney-client relationship does not of itself
supply the attorney with authority to make extra
judicial admissions on behalf of his client, and the
attorney's authority to make such statements is
measured by the same tests of express or implied
authority as are applied to other agents. In that
case the defendant's attorney, in an out of court
admission, said that he had investigated the ditch
in controversy and l1ad found that the defendant
had not completed his work in respect to the ditch
and that he would try and get the defendant to
finish the work. The court held that the defendant
was not bound by this statement of his attorney and
they laid down the following rule of law: Out of
court admissions of fact by an attorney, whether
written or oral, whicl1 have not been made for the
specific judicial purpose of dispensing with the
proof or for influencing the procedure in the case
are inadmissible in evidence against his client, unless
it appears that aside from his mere employment in
connection with pending or prospective litigation
the attorney had some special authority.
4
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Another expression of the basic principle is
the rule in Jackson v. Schine Lexington Corp. (Kentucky 1947) 205 SW2d 1013. There the court held
that an attorney has no power to prejudice his client
by admissions of fact made out of court, because an
agency such as the attorney-client relationship does
not carry the implication of authority to make binding admissions other than in the general managenlent of the litigation. The court also laid down the
principle that a written admission has no more
efficacy than an oral one. McGary v. McGary (Pa.
1898) 43 W.N.C. 268, held that it was proper to
exclude from evidence a letter written by the defendant's attorney to one having the custody of
the deed, wl1erein language was used inconsistent
with the contention of the client that the deed had
been delivered to her. In other words, these cases
hold that written admissions of fact made by an
attorney out of court cannot be used against his
client unless they were made for the specific purpose of dispensing witl1 proof or influencing the procedure in a cause, or unless it appears that the
attorney had some special authority to act for his
client out of court and that the admissions were
properly related thereto.
It is the policy of the law to encourage interchanges between parties to a pending or prospective
litigation in the hope that they will solve their prob5
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lems out of court. If every out of court statement by
an attorney was admissible in evidence an attorney
would be afraid to make any opinion or admission,
and as a result parties to a pending or prospective
litigation would seldom, if ever, be able to reach a
compromise, nor would there be any cooperation
between the parties to speed up the judicial process.

Coirre v. Arrow Exterminating Co. (N.Y.1951)
108 N.Y. Supp. 603, held that a statement inconsistent with plaintiff's testimony by plaintiff's counsel
to the defendants was hearsay, and to treat the
statement as binding would be against public policy
because such a ruling would virtually do away with
the frien'dly interchange of views between opposing
counsel.
It is evident from the above cases, which are.
the great weight of authority, that the attorneyclient relationship does not of itself supply the attorney with authority to make extra judicial admissions. The only exceptions are :
1. Admissions dispensing with the proof
in the case or influencing the procedure in
the case.
2. Admissions in the general management of the litigation.
3. Where the attorney has special authority to make such admissions.
The written statement of Mr. Monosson in his
6
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letter to the American Buyers Company was merely
his opinion as to the state of the name "Budget"
and was not made to dispense with proof or influence
the procedure in any pending or prospective litigation, nor was the admission made in the general
management of any litigation. Mr. Monosson's position was one of giving advice and opinions on matters affecting his company, but this does not mean
that every opinion and bit of advice that he renders
binds his company and can be used by an adversary
in some future proceeding. To so hold would be to
severely curtail the usefulness and purpose of a house
counsel, for he would be afraid to make any statement for fear that something he might say would
prove detrimental to his client in future litigation.
The policy of the law is to encourage interchange
bet¥Jeen adverse and potentially adverse parties in
the hope that an out of court settlement can be made.
POINT II.
AN ATTORNEY HAS NO IMPLIED C0NSENT TO
8URRENDER ANY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF HIS
CLIENT, OR IMP AIR OR DESTROY HIS CLIENT'S
CAUSE OF ACTION.
1

It is also the contention of appellant that Mr.
Monosson had no express or i1nplied authority to
write in a letter a statement which in the future
had the possibility of impairing or destroying a
right or cause of action of his client, and therefore
Exl1ibit P-11 should not have been adn1itted in evi7
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dence by the trial court. The following case law
bears this outo
The California District Court of Appeal in Bice
v. Stevens (Cal. 1958) 325 P2d 244, laid down the
following rule of law when it said on page 251 of
the opinion: "The law does not favor snap judgment. The policy of the law is to have every litigated
case trie'd on its merits; and it looks with disfavor
upon a party who regardless of the merits of the
case attempts to take advantage of the mistake,
surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary
... " In that case the court held that a client was
not bound when his attorney dismissed one of the
defendants "with prejudice" by mistake and without
his client's consent.
The Utah Supreme Court has given credence
to this line of reasoning by way of dicta in Rackham
v. R~ackham (Utah 1951) 2'30 P2d 566, when it
said: "* * * an attorney has no authority to enter
into a stipulation relative to the substantial rights
of his client without his client's consent * * *" In
the case of Gagnon Company v. Nevada Desert Inn
(Calif. Sup. Ct. 1955) 289 P2d 466, the court held
that the conduct and management of the action is
entrusted to the judgment of plaintiff's attorney,
who decides what should be contested and what point
should be taken or abandoned, in absence of special
instructions by the client, but he ordinarily does
8
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not have implied authority to do an act which will
effect surrender or loss of his client's substantial
rights as the client determines the objective to be
obtained.

9
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CONCLUSION
The appellant therefore contends that Exhibit
P-11 should not have been admitted into evidence,
because the courts uniformly hold that out of court
admissions by an attorney which do not dispense
with the proof or influence the procedure or management of the litigation are inadmissible unless
the attorney had some special authority. This is
the case here as has heretofore been shown. Also
an attorney may not surrender any substantial right
of his client or impair, compromise, or destroy his
client's cause of action as plaintiff claims was done
by Mr. Monosson jn this case by his letter. Lastly,
public policy decries holding appellant's attorney
for something he might have said prior to the litigation.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully submits
that Exhibit P-11 was improperly offered by respondent and improperly admitted by the trial court
and therefore should not be considered by this Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS H. CALLISTER and
NATHAN J. FULLMER
Attorneys for Appellant
619 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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